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  In this paper we examine the empirical relationship between immigration and crime 
across Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003. Drawing on police data, we first 
document that the size of the immigrant population is positively correlated with the 
incidence of property crimes and with the overall crime rate. We then use instrumental 
variables based on migration towards other European countries to identify the causal impact 
of exogenous changes in the immigrant population of Italy. According to these estimates, 
immigration increases only the incidence of robberies and has no effect on all other types of 
crime. Since robberies represent a very small fraction of all criminal offences, the effect on 
the overall crime rate is not significantly different from zero. 
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Immigration is a contentious issue in all destination countries for at least two reasons.
First, worker 
ows from countries characterized by a dierent composition of the labor force
may have signicant redistributive consequences for native population. Second, there are
widespread concerns that immigrants increase crime rates. While the economic literature has
devoted much attention to the rst issue (Borjas, 1994; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Bauer and
Zimmermann, 2002; Card, 2005) the second one has remained largely unexplored.
At the same time, citizens and policymakers in host countries seem more concerned about
the impact of immigrants on crime. Figure 1 shows the results of the National Identity survey
carried on in 1995 and 2003 by the International Social Survey Programme. It emerges clearly
that the majority of population in OECD countries is worried that immigrants increase crime
rates. In most cases this fraction is greater than that of people afraid of being displaced from
the labor market. These perceptions may have far-reaching consequences for immigration
policies (Bauer et al., 2000).
According to economic theories of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) immigrants and
natives may have dierent propensities to commit crime because they face dierent legitimate
earnings opportunities, dierent probabilities to be convicted and dierent costs of conviction.
However, the direction of such eects is unclear. For example, immigrants may experience
worse labor market conditions (LaLonde and Topel, 1991; Borjas, 1998) but higher costs
of conviction (Butcher and Piehl, 2005). Hence, identifying the eect of immigration is
ultimately an empirical issue. Somewhat surprisingly, however, there is little systematic
evidence in this respect.
In this paper we estimate the causal eect of immigration on crime across Italian provinces
during the period 1990-2003. For this purpose, we draw on police administrative records to
document the patterns of criminal oenses, disaggregated along various typologies, and of
immigration, both in its regular and irregular component.
As we discuss in the next Section, Italy displays several interesting features for our analy-
sis. First, during the last few years Italy has experienced a considerable increase in migration
pressures, mostly as a consequence of political turmoil in neighboring countries. Similarly
to many other receiving countries, this phenomenon resulted in substantial concerns at the
social and political level, mainly because of the alleged relationship between immigration
and crime. Second, during our sample period Italian authorities have implemented several
1We want to thank Giuseppe Casamassima of the Italian Ministry of Interior for the data on residence
permits. We also thank Massimiliano Bratti, Matteo Cervellati, Antonio Ciccone, Federico Cingano, Francesco
Drago, Giovanni Mastrobuoni, Ugo Melchionda, Franco Peracchi, Alfonso Rosolia, Enrico Sette, Andrea Tiseno
and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, CEIS Tor Vergata, Paris School of Economics, ESPE (London),
NASM (Pittsburgh), FEMES (Singapore), EEA (Milan) and AIEL (Brescia) for many useful comments.
All errors are our responsibility. Financial support from CEPREMAP and from Region Ile-de-France (Milo
Bianchi) is gratefully acknowledged. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
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3massive regularizations of previously unocial immigrants, which allow for an estimate of
the irregular component of migration.
In Section 3 we start our econometric analysis with an OLS estimation in which we
control extensively for other determinants of criminal activity, as well as for province- and
year-specic unobserved heterogeneity. According to these estimates, a 1% increase in the
total number of immigrants is associated with a 0.1% increase in the total number of criminal
oenses. Once we distinguish among categories of crime, the eect seems particularly strong
for property crimes, and in particular for robberies and thefts.
We go on in Section 4 by asking whether this evidence can be attributed to a causal
eect of immigration on crime. Any interpretation in this sense must take into account that
the location choice of immigrants within the destination country may respond to unobserved
demand-pull factors that are also correlated with crime. As a result, OLS estimates may be
biased.
In order to solve this problem, we exploit dierences in the intensity of migration by origin
country as a source of exogenous variation in the distribution of immigrants across Italian
provinces. In particular, we use changes of immigrant population by nationality in the rest
of Europe as an instrument for changes of immigrant population in Italy. Our identication
strategy relies on the fact that the supply-push component of migration by nationality is
common to 
ows toward all destination countries. At the same time, 
ows toward the rest of
Europe are exogenous to demand-pull factors in Italian provinces. Variation across provinces
of supply-driven shifts of immigrant population results from dierences in the beginning-of-
period distribution of immigrants by origin country. Indeed, rst stage estimates conrm
that our instrument provides a strongly statistically signicant prediction of migration to
Italy.
Once we take into account the endogeneity of immigrants' distribution across provinces,
the estimated eect of immigration on neither total nor property crimes is signicantly dif-
ferent from zero. Distinguishing among dierent types of property crime, the estimated
coecient is still statistically signicant for robberies. However, the latter represent only a
very minor fraction of all crimes in our sample, which explains why the eect on the total
crime rate is not statistically signicant.
In Section 5, we discuss the robustness of our results with respect to measurement error,
spatial correlation and heterogeneity across dierent nationalities; Section 6 concludes.
Even though previous evidence on immigration and crime is very scant, there are some
previous papers related to this work. Butcher and Piehl (1998b, 2005) nd that current U.S.
immigrants have lower incarceration rates than natives, while the pattern seems reversed for
immigrants in the early 1900s (Moehling and Piehl, 2007). At the aggregate level, Butcher
and Piehl (1998a) look at a sample of U.S. metropolitan areas over the 1980s and conclude
that new immigrants in
ows had no signicant impact on crime rates.
42 Immigration and crime in Italy: measurement and charac-
teristics
Immigration to Italy displays several interesting features for the purpose of our analysis.
First, it is a very recent phenomenon, which basically started in the early 1980s and took
o during the 1990s. The rst law regulating the in
ows of foreigners was approved in
1990, later amended in 1998 and 2002. Throughout this period, Italian migration policy has
remained grounded on the residence permit, which allows the holder to stay legally in the
country for a given period of time. We have drawn directly on police administrative records
for recovering the number of valid residence permits by province and nationality during the
period 1990-2003. These data serve as our measure of legal immigration.
Second, immigration has increased dramatically over this period. The number of residence
permits rose by a factor of 5, from 436,000 in 1990 (less than 1% of total population) to over
2.2 millions in 2003 (4% of population). Such growth was signicantly driven by push factors
in neighboring countries, like the collapse of Soviet Union and the Balkan Wars (see Del
Boca and Venturini, 2003). Overall, immigration from Eastern Europe grew at a rate of
537% during the period 1990-2003, as compared to 134% from Northern Africa and 170%
from Asia. Accordingly, our estimating strategy will exploit such push factors to identify the
causal eect of immigration on crime.
Third, during this period Italy implemented several regularizations, which oered irreg-
ular immigrants the possibility to obtain a residence permit. In particular, regularizations
in 1995, 1998, and 2002 involved 246, 217 and 700 thousand individuals, respectively. For
our purposes, regularizations are important as they provide snapshots of irregular migration.
During these episodes, in fact, immigrants had clear incentives to report their irregular sta-
tus. Hence, underreporting may be less serious and less correlated with other variables than
in survey data and in apprehension statistics.2
Therefore, we obtained from police administrative records also the demands for regular-
ization presented in 1995, 1998 and 2002. As it turns out, the distribution of regular and
irregular immigrants are tightly related. In particular, the ratio of the two is very stable
within provinces and (regularization) years. In order to see this, let MIGRit and IRRit be
the number of regular and irregular immigrants in province i and year t, respectively. Then,
we predict the latter based on the OLS regression
[ IRRit = ^ iMIGRit + ^ tMIGRit + ^ it;
where ^ i and ^ t are province- and year-specic estimated coecients, respectively, and ^ it is
the estimated residual. Figure 2 shows that the dierence between IRRit and [ IRRit at the
2In any case, all these alternative measures of irregular migration are strongly correlated with each other,
as we discuss further in Section 5.
5province-year level is almost negligible. Actually, the variance of ^ it is less than 2% of total















it and POPit are total immigrants and population in each province-year, re-
spectively. Taking logarithms on both sides delivers
migr
it = i + t + migrit + it: (1)
where migr
it and migrit are, respectively, the logarithms of total and regular immigrants
over population, and it is an error term. The OLS estimated coecient of migrit is 0.92
(R2 = 99%), which conrms that (after controlling for province and year xed eects) regular
immigrants are approximately proportional to total immigrant population in each province-
year. Since total immigrants would be unobserved out of regularization years, we will use the
(log of) regular immigrants instead.
Turning to measures of criminal activity, we look at crimes reported by the police to the
judiciary authority, which are published yearly by the Italian Statistics Institute (ISTAT).
These data allow to distinguish among several types of criminal oenses: violent crimes,
property crimes (robbery, common theft, car theft) and drug-related crimes. Availability of
these data determined our sample period, 1990-2003. In 2004, in fact, a new national crime
recording standard has been adopted, which implies a lack of comparability of data before
and after that year (ISTAT, 2004, p.27).
In general, a major drawback of crime data is measurement error, caused for instance by
under-reporting, heterogeneous law enforcement, and so on. Following a standard approach,
we assume that, rst, the number of reported crimes, CRIMEit, is proportional to the true
(unobserved) number of committed crimes, CRIME
it; second, the constant of proportionality
does not vary within provinces and years. It follows that
crime
it = i + t + crimeit; (2)
where crime
it and crimeit are, respectively, the logarithms of actual and reported crimes
over total population, and i and t are province and year xed eects. Therefore, we will
use crimeit as a proxy for the true (unobserved) crime rate (Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1996).
Accordingly, total, violent, property and drug will denote the logarithms of reported crimes
over total population for each category of criminal oenses.
At a rst glance, criminal activity and immigration are not systematically correlated over
time (see Figure 3). On the other hand, immigration appears to be positively associated
with crime across provinces; in particular, both tend to be higher in the North (Figure 4).
However, both variables could respond to other (omitted) factors. For instance, higher wealth
6in Northern Italy could encourage both immigration and property crimes, which represent
83% of all criminal oenses in our sample. Therefore, in the next section we move beyond
simple correlations and into multivariate econometric analysis.
3 Panel Analysis
Identifying the eect of migration on crime is complicated by the fact that both variables
are simultaneously determined in equilibrium. To address this issue, we start by controlling
for other variables that may aect both immigration and crime, along with province- and
year-specic unobserved heterogeneity. We thus assembled annual observations for all 95
Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003.3
Our main estimating equation is
crimeit = migrit + 
0Xit + i + t + "it; (3)
where crimeit is the log of the crime rate reported by the police in province i during year t;
migrit is the log of immigrants over population; Xit is a set of control variables; nally, i
and t are province- and year-specic unobserved xed eect, while "it is an error term. We
are mainly interested in identifying coecient .
The set of observables Xit comprises demographic, socioeconomic and politico-institutional
determinants of crime.4 Demographic variables include the log of resident population in the
province, pop. Since equation (3) includes province xed eects, pop implicitly controls for
population density, which is considered a key determinant of the level of criminal activity
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). For the same reason, we control for the share of population
living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, urban. Finally, since young men are said
to be more prone to engage in criminal activities than the rest of the population (Freeman,
1991; Levitt, 1998; Grogger, 1998), we add the percentage of men aged 15-39, male1539.
Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include the (log of) real GDP per capita, gdp,
and the unemployment rate, unemp. These factors proxy for the legitimate and illegitimate
earning opportunities (Ehrlich, 1973; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Gould et al., 2002).
The probability of apprehension captures instead the expected costs of crime. As a proxy
for such a probability, we use the clear   up rate, dened as the ratio of crimes cleared up
by the police over the total number of reported crimes, for each category of crime (Ehrlich,
1996). The political orientation of the local government may aect the amount of resources
devoted to crime deterrence and at the same time immigration restrictions at the local level.5
3Italian provinces correspond to level 3 in the Eurostat classication (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics); they are comparable in size to U.S. counties. In 1995, 8 new provinces were created by secession. In
order to keep our series consistent, we attribute their post-1995 data to the corresponding pre-1995 province.
4Freeman (1999), Eide et al. (2006) and Dills et al. (2008) review the empirical literature on the determi-
nants of crime.
5The distribution of residence permits across provinces is decided on a yearly basis by the government in
7We measure the ideology of the local government with the variable partisan, which takes
higher values the more the local government leans toward the right of the political spectrum.
Finally, xed eects control for other unobserved factors that do not vary within provinces
or years, including constants 's and 's in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
All variables' detailed denitions and sources are presented in the Appendix. Table 1
shows some descriptive statistics and Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among all de-
pendent and explanatory variables. The univariate correlation between the log of immigrants
and crimes over population is positive for all types of crime.
OLS estimates on equation (3) are presented in Table 3 and suggest that the total crime
rate is signicantly correlated with the incidence of immigrants in the population. Such
relationship is robust to controlling for other determinants of crime. According to these
ndings, a 1% increase in immigrant population is associated with a 0.1% increase of total
crime.
Distinguishing among types of crime, the eect is driven by property crimes (while violent
and drug-related crimes are unaected by immigration). In order to better uncover this rela-
tionship, in Table 4 we disaggregate property crimes further. It turns out that immigration
increases the incidence of robberies and thefts. Since the latter represent about 60% of total
crimes in our sample, the relationship between immigration and property crimes may be the
main channel through which immigrants increase the crime rate.
However, there could be several reasons why immigrant population is systematically cor-
related with property crimes, some of which may not be adequately captured by control
variables. Therefore, identifying causality requires a source of exogenous variation in immi-
grant population, an issue that we tackle in the next Section.
4 Causality
Even after controlling for other determinants of crime and for xed eects, the distribution
of immigrant population across provinces could be correlated with the error term for at least
two reasons. First, our set of controls could neglect some time-varying, possibly unobserved
demand-pull factors that are also correlated with crime. For instance, improvements in labor
market conditions that are not adequately captured by changes in ocial unemployment
and income could increase immigration and decrease crime, which would bias OLS estimates
downward. On the other hand, economic decline could attract immigrants to some areas
(e.g. because of declining housing prices) where crime is on the rise, which would bias OLS
estimates upward. Finally, changes in crime rates across provinces could have a direct eect
on immigrants' location.
In order to take these concerns into account, we adopt a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS)
approach that uses the (exogenous) supply-push component of migration by nationality as an
accordance with provincial authorities.
8instrument for shifts in immigrants population across Italian provinces. Supply-push factors
are all events in origin countries that increase the propensity of population to emigrate; exam-
ples include economic crises, political turmoil, wars and natural disasters (see, for instance,
Card, 1990; Friedberg, 2001; Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Munshi, 2003; Saiz, 2007). Since
these are both important in determining migration out
ows and independent of regional dif-
ferences within the host country, they have often been used as a source of exogenous variation
in the distribution of immigrant population. In particular, several papers have constructed
outcome-based measures of supply-push factors using total migration 
ows by nationality
toward the destination country of interest.6
In principle, however, since new immigrants of a given nationality tend to settle into the
same areas as previous immigrants from the same country (see e.g. Munshi, 2003; Jaeger, 2006;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007), total 
ows by nationality could be still correlated with local
demand-pull factors.7 For this reason, our instrument will be based on bilateral migration

ows toward European countries other than Italy. Specically, we rst take within-province






it   popit; (4)
where the superscript n denotes nationalities and !n
it 1 = MIGRn
it 1=MIGRit 1. The rst
term on the right-hand side is the sum of log-changes of immigrants from country n into des-
tination province i, weighted at beginning-of-period nationality shares within each province.
These depend on both supply-push factors in each origin country (which aect that national-
ity in all provinces) and demand-pull factors in each province (which aect all nationalities in
that province. In order to exclude the latter, we substitute lnMIGRn
it with the log-change
of immigrants of nationality n in the rest of Europe, lnMIGRn.






it 1  lnMIGRn: (5)
Since demand-pull factors in other European countries can be reasonably thought as exoge-
nous to variation between Italian provinces, the correlation between migrit and \ migrit
must be due solely to supply-push factors in origin countries.
To construct our instrument we use the log changes of immigrant population from 13 origin
countries in 11 European countries using decennial census data in the host countries.8 Figure
6See, among others, Card (2001), Lewis (2005) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
7In the limit, if all immigrants from a given country moved to the same Italian province, it would be
impossible to disentangle push and pull factors.
8Ideally, one would use total out
ows from origin countries (possibly excluding in
ows to Italy) as a measure
of supply-push factors. Unfortunately, these data are generally not available. The destination countries
for which we obtained census data are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Information on the stock of immigrants in those countries was
95 shows that the patterns of immigration toward the rest of Europe resemble those observed in
Italy, which points at the importance of supply-push factors. Indeed, the univariate regression
conrms that our instrument ts well the actual changes of immigrant population across






where the numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimated coecients. The
F-statistic of the regression is equal to 14.24, which is above the lower bounds indicated by
the literature on weak instruments (see Bound et al., 1995; Stock and Yogo, 2002).
Once equipped with this instrument for immigrant population, we turn to examine its
eect on crime rates in the second stage. The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. For the
sake of comparability between OLS and 2SLS, in each table we also present OLS estimates
on the cross section of log changes between 1991 and 2001.
While the OLS estimates on 10-years changes are broadly consistent with panel estimates
using all years, the 2SLS estimates present signicant dierences. First, the eect of immi-
gration on the total number of criminal oenses is smaller and not statistically signicant
anymore, and the same is true for property crimes. Once we distinguish among dierent ty-
pologies of property crimes (Table 6), immigration has no signicant eect on thefts. On the
other hand, the eect on robberies is still signicant. Indeed, its magnitude is much greater
than the OLS estimate. This nding may point at the existence of demand-pull factors (not
captured by control variables) that have opposite eects on immigration and on the incidence
of robberies.9
Overall, these results suggest that the causal eect of immigration on either violent,
property or drug-related crimes is not signicantly dierent from zero. Robberies are the
only type of criminal activity that we found to be positively and signicantly aected by
immigration. According to our estimates, the incidence robberies varies approximately one-
to-one (in percentage) with the ratio of immigrants over population. Yet, within our sample
robberies represent only 1.8% and 1.5% of property and total crimes, respectively, which
explains why the incidence of neither property nor total crimes is signicantly related to
immigration.
available for the following nationalities: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China (excluding Hong Kong), Egypt, India,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Tunisia, Former Yugoslavia. Overall, immigrants from
these countries accounted for 48% and 56% of Italian residence permits in 1991 and 2001, respectively.
9An alternative explanation could be that OLS estimates suer from attenuation bias due to measurement
errors in immigrant population. However, if this was the reason, we should observe an analogous bias for all
types of crime, which does not seem to be the case.
105 Robustness
Our ndings may be subject to several caveats, the most signicant of which concern the
measurement of immigrant population. A rst issue relates to its composition by nationality.
In order to avoid arbitrary classications, our measure includes all residence permits, regard-
less of immigrants' origin countries. On the other hand, most crime concerns are directed
toward immigrants from developing countries. While it is beyond the scope of this paper
to investigate the relationship between nationality and propensity to crime, one may won-
der whether adopting this broader denition introduces error in the measurement of those
immigrants that could be more at risk of committing crime.10 Therefore, we checked the
robustness of our estimates to using only residence permits awarded to immigrants from de-
veloping countries, migrdc
it . The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8, and are remarkably
similar to those obtained using all residence permits.
Also, dierences among nationalities could explain the dierences between OLS and 2SLS
estimates. The latter are based on a subset of nationalities (those for which we found Cen-
sus data for other European countries). Therefore, if the excluded nationalities had higher
propensity to crime than those included in the instrument, that would cause the observed
drop in magnitude and signicance from OLS to 2SLS (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In order
to check whether that is the case, we run again OLS regressions including in the measure
of immigration only those nationalities included in the instrument. Results are reported in
Tables 9 and are not signicantly dierent from those in Tables 5 and 6. Hence, basing our
instrument on a subset of nationalities does not drive the dierence between 2SLS and OLS
estimates.
Another issue relates to the dimension of irregular immigration in Italy. As discussed in
Section 3, we used demands for regularization to infer the distribution of irregular immigrants,
arguing that this approach minimizes under-reporting. In principle, however, one can not
exclude that immigrants self-select into regularization, which would introduce measurement
error into equation (1). In particular, if immigrants who are more at risk of committing
crime are also less likely to apply for a regular permit, we would be understating immigrants
exactly where they contribute the most to crime, which in turn would bias the coecient of
migr downward.
For this reason, we looked also at apprehensions of irregular immigrants (as recorded by
Ministero dell'Interno (2007)) which do not depend on self-selection. Indeed, after controlling
for province- and year-specic constants (which are always included in our specications)
the log of apprehensions is positively and signicantly related to the log of demands for
regularization. In particular, the OLS estimated coecient of the univariate regression is
10This measurement issue is particularly relevant for Italy. In our sample, about 85% of all immigrants
from outside developing countries came from U.S. and Switzerland. These are very peculiar groups: the rst
includes mostly U.S. military servants, the second Swiss citizens that commute daily between Switzerland and
Italy.
110.35, the t-ratio is 3.87 and the R2 is 85%. Therefore, apprehension- and regularization-
based measures of irregular immigration seem consistent with each other. At the same time,
regularizations provide a more representative picture of the phenomenon.11
In addition, the 2SLS approach adopted in Section 5 would attenuate any bias due to
under-reporting of irregular immigrants. In fact, if both regular and irregular immigrants of
the same nationality cluster into the same areas, then our instrument provides a measure for
the predicted log-change of total immigrants that depends solely on geographic distribution
and supply-push factors by nationality.
Finally, mobility across the borders of dierent provinces may give rise to spatial corre-
lation in provincial crime data. In line with the literature on spatial econometrics and crime
(Anselin, 1988; Gibbons, 2004; Zenou, 2003), we thus control for spatially lagged crime rates.
These consist of weighted averages of crime rates in neighboring provinces. In particular,
crime in province i is assumed to depend also on crime observed in any other province j,
weighted by the inverse of the distance between their capital cities. The results, presented in
Table 10, are consistent with those in our baseline specication. Hence, spatial correlation
does not aect aect our results. This is probably due to the fact that provinces are rather
large geographical areas, so that crime trips occur within rather than across provinces.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the causal impact of immigration on crime across Italian
provinces during the 1990s. According to our estimates, total criminal oenses as well as
most types of crime are not related to the size of immigrant population once endogeneity is
taken into account.
We view our contribution as a rst step towards a better understanding of this relation-
ship. There are several ways in which our analysis can be extended in search of more detailed
mechanisms, and we sketch only a few here.
First, one can explore natives' response to an increase in immigration. Our result, in fact,
could be due to the fact that immigrants and natives have similar propensities to commit
crime and/or there is substitution between immigrants' and natives' crime. 12 Moving in
this direction would require more detailed criminal statistics, which allow to distinguish the
nationality of the oender.13
Second, we estimate the average eect of immigration conditional on its current composi-
tion. However, this eect is probably dierent for regular and irregular immigrants. Indeed,
it would be extremely interesting to estimate separately the eect of the two. But while the
11In 1995 there were less than 64,000 apprehensions and 260,000 demands for regularization; this ratio was
61,000 over 250,000 in 1998 and 106,000 over 700,000 in 2002
12Borjas et al. (2006) argues that recent immigrants have contributed to the criminal activity of native black
males in the U.S. by displacing them from the labor market.
13However, these data are publicly available for Italy only since 2000 on.
12strong correlation between the two is useful for recovering the variation in total immigrants
using only the regular ones, it does not allow to disentangle their separate eects.
A better understanding of such mechanisms seems crucial also for policy prescriptions.
In fact, any change in migration restrictions is likely to aect both the size and composition
of immigrant population (Bianchi, 2007; Giordani and Ruta, 2008). Therefore, its eect may
dier from the one estimated by keeping immigrants' composition constant. This eect has
to be considered before arguing in favor or against tighter immigration restrictions.
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16Appendix
Variables: denitions and sources
migr: log of residence permits over total province population, as of December 31 of each
year. Source: Ministry of Interior.
total: log og reported crimes in each province and year. This category includes murder,
serious assault, rape, sex oence, theft, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, incrimination for
criminal association, arson, terrorism, drug-related crime, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud,
prostitution, other crimes. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute
of Statistics.
violent: log of reported violent crimes over total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
property: log of reported property crimes over total population in each province and year.
This category includes robberies, thefts and car thefts. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali
- Italian National Institute of Statistics.
theft: log of reported thefts over total population in each province and year. This category
includes several types of crime such as: bag snatch and pickpocketing. Source: Statistiche
Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
robbery: log of reported robberies over total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
car theft: log of reported car thefts over total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
drug: log of reported drug-related crimes over total population in each province and year.
This category includes tracking, consumption and pushing. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
pop: log of resident population in each province and year. Source: Popolazione e movimento
anagraco dei comuni - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
urban: percentage of population living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in each
province and year. Source: Popolazione e movimento anagraco dei comuni - Italian National
Institute of Statistics.
male1539: percentage of young males aged 15-39 in the population in each province and
year. Source: Popolazione e movimento anagraco dei comuni - Italian National Institute of
Statistics.
gdp: log of real GDP per-capita in each province and year. Source: Conti Economici Terri-
toriali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
17unemp: percentage unemployment ratio in each province and year. Source: Labour Force
Survey - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
clear up: percentage ratio of the number of crimes cleared by the police to the total number
of reported crimes, for each province, year and crime category. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
partisan: ideology of the provincial government. This variable is constructed as follows.
First, a score between 0 (extreme left) and 20 (extreme right) is attached to each political
party according to the expert surveys presented in Benoit and Laver (2006) (these data are
available at http://www.tcd.ie/Political Science/ppmd/). Then, the score of the local gov-
ernment is computed as the average score of all parties entering executive cabinet weighted
by the number of seats held by each party in the local council (the composition of Italian
local councils is available at http://amministratori.interno.it/).
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This graph presents the results of the \National Identity \survey conducted in 1995 and 2003 by the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme. The vertical axis is the percentage of interviewed in each country that
declared to \Strongly Agree"or \Agree"that \Immigrants increase crime rates ". The horizontal axis is the
percentage of interviewed in each country that declared to \Strongly Agree"or \Agree"that \Immigrants take
jobs away from natives ".
19Figure 2: Actual and predicted irregular immigrants
This gure plots the actual number of irregular immigrants (on the vertical axis) against the number predicted
based on regular immigrants (on the horizontal axis) along with the 45-degree line. The actual number of
irregular immigrants is given by the number of demands for regularization presented in province i and year t.
The prediction is based on regression [ IRRit = ^ iMIGRit + ^ tMIGRit + ^ it, where MIGRit is the number of
residence permits in province i and year t during years 1995, 1998 and 2002 (see Section 2 for further details).
The source of data on both residence permits and demands for regularization is the Italian Ministry of Interior.
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This graph shows the evolution over time of reported crimes and residence permits in Italy. The histogram
refers to the number of reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, distinguishing between dierent categories
of criminal oenses. The line refers to the number of residence permits awarded to immigrants in Italy, per
100,000 inhabitants. The source of data on reported crimes and residence permits are ISTAT and the Italian
Ministry of Interior, respectively.
21Figure 4: Immigration and crime across provinces
These gures show the distribution, across Italian provinces, of the number of immigrants and reported crimes
per 100,000 inhabitants. All variables are yearly averages during the period 1990-2003. Provinces are colored
according to which quartile of the distribution they belong to; darker colors refer to higher values. The
extremes of each quartile, along with the corresponding color, are reported at the bottom of each map. The
sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior,
respectively.
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log−change of immigrants in the rest of Europe
This gure plots the log-change of immigrant population in Italy during the 1991-2001 period (on the vertical
axis) against the log-change of immigrant population in other European countries during the same period
(on the horizontal axis), by country of origin. Immigrant population in Italy is measured by the number of
residence permits, as reported by the Italian Ministry of Interior. Immigrant population in other European
countries is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The destination countries for which
we obtained census data are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Information on the stock of immigrants in those countries was available for
the following nationalities: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China (excluding Hong Kong), Egypt, India, Morocco,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Tunisia, Former Yugoslavia.
23Table 1: Descriptive statistics
observations mean std. dev. min. max
Residence permits per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 1353 1187 44 7873
Total crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 3388 1350 1072 13404
Violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 50 29 1 230
Property crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 2615 1216 442 7879
robberies 1330 37 41 2 385
thefts 1330 1943 909 321 6049
car thefts 1330 287 281 29 1648
Drug-related crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 64 45 5 918
migr 1330 -4.64 0.85 -7.73 -2.54
total 1330 -3.45 0.37 -4.54 -2.01
violent 1330 -7.75 0.55 -11.19 -6.07
property 1330 -3.75 0.45 -5.42 -2.54
robbery 1330 -8.23 0.75 -10.74 -5.56
theft 1330 -4.04 0.45 -5.74 -2.81
car theft 1330 -6.22 0.83 -8.14 -4.11
drug 1330 -7.52 0.57 -9.84 -4.69
pop 1330 13.01 0.70 11.41 15.18
urban 1235 14.62 20.15 0.00 88.11
male1539 1330 18.01 1.23 14.41 21.03
gdp 1235 9.55 0.26 8.94 10.11
unemp 1045 10.43 7.09 1.68 33.16
clear   up (total crimes) 1330 30.54 10.47 9.20 82.75
clear   up (violent crimes) 1330 82.03 12.93 23.32 100.00
clear   up (property crimes) 1330 6.92 3.18 1.60 30.83
clear   up (drug-related crimes) 1330 95.77 5.61 37.71 100.00
partisan 1330 10.26 1.75 5.90 16.30
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables across the
95 Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003.
24Table 2: Correlation Matrix
migr total violent property drug pop urban male1539 gdp unemp clear   up
total 0.356
violent 0.289 0.377
property 0.287 0.879 0.176
drug 0.205 0.383 0.147 0.244
pop 0.125 0.465 -0.062 0.598 0.036
urban 0.208 0.550 0.091 0.557 0.171 0.475
male1539 -0.471 -0.074 -0.120 0.036 -0.209 0.375 -0.053
gdp 0.710 0.328 0.266 0.298 0.199 0.072 0.216 -0.407
unemp -0.607 -0.084 -0.179 -0.070 -0.136 0.138 0.057 0.425 -0.858
clear   up -0.276 -0.511 0.069 -0.723 0.070 -0.459 -0.404 -0.009 -0.288 0.113
partisan 0.164 0.024 0.134 0.055 -0.065 0.116 -0.112 0.196 0.068 -0.060 -0.092
Notes: This table reports the correlation matrix between the ratio of immigrants over total population and the ratio of reported crimes over
total population, distinguished by type of crime, across the 95 Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003.
2
5Table 3: Panel regressions: baseline
total violent property drug total violent property drug
migr 0.103 -.007 0.126 -.190 0.102 0.003 0.084 -.103
(0.034) (0.057) (0.031) (0.06) (0.039) (0.084) (0.028) (0.074)
pop 0.028 -.338 0.96 -2.550
(0.641) (1.660) (0.718) (1.552)
urban 0.003 -.003 0.003 -.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
male1539 0.131 0.236 0.041 0.325
(0.045) (0.11) (0.053) (0.108)
gdp 0.15 -.116 0.171 0.423
(0.14) (0.319) (0.166) (0.378)
unemp -.004 0.011 -.007 0.019
(0.004) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
clear   up -.004 -.008 -.030 0.0003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
partisan 0.007 0.045 0.007 0.023
(0.01) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015)
Obs. 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045
Provinces 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Prov. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.153 0.266 0.162 0.171 0.220 0.321 0.302 0.189
F-stat. 21.54 9.69 17.70 35.76 14.81 7.37 11.68 17.26
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 95 Italian
provinces during the period 1991-2003. The dependent variable is the log of crimes reported by the police over
total population, for each category of criminal oenses. The variable migr is the log of immigrants (i.e. residence
permits) over province population. The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and
the Italian Ministry of Interior, respectively. All other variables are dened in the Appendix. Province and year
xed-eects are included in all specications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and ***
denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level,
respectively.
2
6Table 4: Panel regressions: property crimes breakdown
robbery theft car theft robbery theft car theft
migr 0.197 0.14 0.045 0.092 0.093 0.057
(0.05) (0.032) (0.041) (0.05) (0.03) (0.041)
pop 4.285 1.155 0.365
(1.026) (0.686) (0.958)
gdp -.155 0.113 0.611
(0.267) (0.164) (0.232)
unemp -.022 -.006 -.003
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
urban 0.0007 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
male1539 -.145 0.052 0.1
(0.084) (0.053) (0.072)
clear   up -.005 -.030 -.005
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
partisan 0.006 0.007 -.003
(0.013) (0.009) (0.011)
Obs. 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,045 1,045 1,045
Provinces 95 95 95 95 95 95
Prov. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.156 0.146 0.296 0.241 0.28 0.323
F-stat. 14.91 15.12 23.31 14.17 9.77 14.72
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for
all 95 Italian provinces during the period 1991-2003. The dependent variable is the log of
crimes reported by the police over total population, for each category of criminal oenses.
The variable migr is the log of immigrants (i.e. residence permits) over province population.
The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian
Ministry of Interior, respectively. All other variables are dened in the Appendix. Province
and year xed-eects are included in all specications. Robust standard errors are presented
in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being
equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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7Table 5: Ten-year dierence regressions
Panel A: Second-Stage
Ten-year dierences: OLS Ten-year dierences: IV
total violent property drug total violent property drug
 migr .1558 -.0389 .1362 -.2680 .1051 -.0964 .0456 -.1852
(.0492) (.1120) (.0452) (.0934) (.1874) (.4474) (.1498) (.2990)
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.241 0.062 0.276 0.219
F-stat 5.40 1.56 6.95 4.95
Panel B: First-Stage
\ migrit 0.5223 0.4585 0.5346 0.5446
(0.1441) (0.1672) (0.1604) (0.1620)
F-stat (excl. instr.) 13.14 7.52 11.11 11.30
Notes: The top panel of this table presents the results of OLS and IV (second-stage) estimates on the cross-section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log-change of the number of crimes reported
by the police over total population, for each category of criminal oenses. The variable migr is the log-change of immigrants (i.e.
residence permits) over province population. The bottom panel reports rst-stage estimates of IV regressions. The rst-stage instrument,
lnMIGR
IV , is the weighted sum of the log-changes of immigrant population by nationality in other European countries. The weights are
the shares of permits held by each nationality over total permits in that province in 1990 (see equation 5 in the main text). The log-changes
of all control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are always included, both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits
and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior, respectively. Immigrant population in other European countries is
measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for excluded instruments refers to the null hypothesis that
the coecient of the excluded instrument is equal to zero in the rst stage. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
2
8Table 6: Ten-year dierence regressions: property crimes breakdown
Panel A: Second-Stage
Ten-year dierences: OLS Ten-year dierences: IV
robbery theft car theft robbery theft car theft
migr .3508 .1555 -.0328 1.0234 .1437 -.1167
(.0890) (.0453) (.0807) (.3602) (.1509) (.2412)
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.193 0.308 0.124
F-stat 4.14 7.87 2.36
Panel B: First-Stage
\ migrit 0.5528 0.5311 0.5549
(0.1626) (0.1593) (0.1599)
1st stage F-stat. 11.56 11.11 12.04
Notes: The top panel of this table presents the results of OLS and IV (second-stage) estimates on the cross-
section of ten-year dierences between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable
is the log-change of the number of crimes reported by the police over total population, for each category of
criminal oenses. The variable migr is the log-change of immigrants (i.e. residence permits) over province
population. The bottom panel reports rst-stage estimates of IV regressions. The rst-stage instrument,
\ migrit, is the weighted sum of the log-changes of immigrant population by nationality in other European
countries. The weights are the shares of permits held by each nationality over total permits in that province
in 1990 (see equation 5 in the main text). The log-changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are always
included, both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are
ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior, respectively. Immigrant population in other European countries
is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for excluded instruments
refers to the null hypothesis that the coecient of the excluded instrument is equal to zero in the rst stage.
Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of
the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
2
9Table 7: Robustness: immigrants from developing countries
Panel A: Second-Stage
Ten-year dierences: OLS Ten-year dierences: IV
total violent property drug total violent property drug
lnmigrdc .1477 -.0478 .1321 -.2462 .1009 -.0934 .0438 -.1779
(.0506) (.1155) (.0487) (.0936) (.1797) (.4345) (.1435) (.5669)
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.236 0.062 0.273 0.210
F-stat 5.16 1.57 6.73 4.66
Panel B: First-Stage
\ migrit 0.5439 0.4730 .5570 0. .5670
(0.1533) (0.1735) (0.1698) (0.1714)
F-stat (excl. instr.) 12.59 7.44 10.76 10.94
Notes: The top panel of this table presents the results of OLS and IV (second-stage) estimates on the cross-section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log-change of the number of crimes reported by the
police over total population, for each category of criminal oenses. The variable migr
dc is the log-change of immigrants from developing
countries over province population. The bottom panel reports rst-stage estimates of IV regressions. The rst-stage instrument, \ migrit,
is the weighted sum of the log-changes of immigrant population by nationality in other European countries. The weights are the shares
of permits held by each nationality over total permits in that province in 1990 (see equation 5 in the main text). The log-changes of all
control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are always included, both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits
and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior, respectively. Immigrant population in other European countries is
measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for excluded instruments refers to the null hypothesis that
the coecient of the excluded instrument is equal to zero in the rst stage. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **
and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
3
0Table 8: Robustness: immigrants from developing countries, property crimes breakdown
Panel A: Second-Stage
Ten-year dierences: OLS Ten-year dierences: IV
robbery theft car theft robbery theft car theft
migrdc .3372 .1519 -.0370 .9846 .1379 -.1123
(.0884) (.0488) (.0787) (.3461) (.1440) (.2331)
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.185 0.305 0.125
F-stat 4.03 7.69 2.36
Panel B: First-Stage
\ migrit 0.5746 0.5537 0.5769
(0.1833) (0.1802) (0.1816)
1st stage F-stat. 9.83 9.44 10.09
Notes: The top panel of this table presents the results of OLS and IV (second-stage) estimates on the
cross-section of ten-year dierences between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent
variable is the log-change of the number of crimes reported by the police over total population, for each
category of criminal oenses. The variable migr
dc is the log-change of immigrants from developing countries
over province population. The bottom panel reports rst-stage estimates of IV regressions. The rst-stage
instrument, \ migrit, is the weighted sum of the log-changes of immigrant population by nationality in other
European countries. The weights are the shares of permits held by each nationality over total permits in
that province in 1990 (see equation 5 in the main text). The log-changes of all control variables in Tables
3 and 4 are always included, both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits
and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior, respectively. Immigrant population in
other European countries is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for
excluded instruments refers to the null hypothesis that the coecient of the excluded instrument is equal to
zero in the rst stage. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of
the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
3
1Table 9: Robustness: composition by nationality
total violent property drug robbery theft car theft
migrnat .1301 -.0252 .1224 -.2455 .3213 .1385 -.0120
(.0407) (.1176) (.0375) (.0754) (.0737) (.0373) (.0618)
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.236 0.061 0.282 0.227 0.210 0.314 0.123
F-stat 5.83 1.58 7.58 5.42 4.73 8.61 2.38
Notes: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on the cross-section of ten-year dierences between 1991
and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log-change of the number of crimes
reported by the police over total population, for each category of criminal oenses. The variable migr
nat is the
log-change of immigrants of those nationalities included in \ migr (listed in Section 4) over province population.
The log-changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are always included, both in the rst and second stage.
The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior,
respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null
hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
3
2Table 10: Robustness: spatial correlation
total violent property drug robbery theft car theft
migr .0977 -.1349 .0453 -.1711 .9556 .1416 -.2015
(.1903) (.4395) (.1516) (.3015) (.2664) (.1525) (.2606)
Spatial lag .3799 .6074 .0588 .6601 .7216 .1644 .0581
(.4792) (.3281) (.6110) (.2914) (.2559) (.5716) (.5570)
Notes: This table presents the results of IV (second-stage) estimates on the cross-section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log-change of the number of
crimes reported by the police over total population, for each category of criminal oenses. The variable migr
is the log-change of immigrants over province population and is instrumented in the rst stage by \ migrit (see
equation 5 in the main text). The spatial lag is the weighted sum of the log of crimes over ppopulation in all
other provinces, with weighting matrix based on the inverse of road travelling distance between provinces. The
log-changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are always included, both in the rst and second stage.
The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior,
respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null
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